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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
... ,>~ 
E. R. SHAW and ESSIE 0. SHAW, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BAILEY- McCUNE COMPANY, a corpora-
ration, W. LEE BAILEY, GAYLE BAILEY, 
and SPRINGVILLE BANKING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 9206 
Respondents disagree wth the statement of facts set 
forth by appellants. Matters favoring the trial court's 
holding have been omitted therefrom, and the alleged facts 
are interspersed with opinions and conclusions. The Court's 
attention is directed to the evidence and record in the fol-
lowing parti!culars. 
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2 
.A!ppellants, E. R. Shaw and Essie 0. Shaw, commenced 
this action in the lower court to recover from respondents, 
Bailey-McC·une Company, a ·corporation, and W. Lee Bai-
ley and Bayle Bailey individually, unpaid rent and the pur-
chase price of ~merchandise sold ( R. 1-5) . Over one year 
after the commencement of this action, an amended com-
plaint was filed alleging that Bailey-McCune Company, a 
corporation, was the alter ego of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle 
Bailey, and therefore the individual defendants were per-
sonally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations 
(R. 16-17). Upon the trial of the case the court awarded 
judgment to appellants against the corporation, but find-
ing no personal liability on the part of W. Lee Bailey and 
Gayle Bailey entered judgment dismissing the action as 
to them. (See amended judgment and decree). 
Appellants have appealed on the question of personal 
liability, claiming that it was error for the trial court to 
fail to find W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey personally liable. 
No grounds for the alleged error have been specified by 
appellants in their brief. (See Appellants' Brief, page 6). 
Bailey-McCune Company, a Utah Corporation, having 
its principal place of business in Nephi, Utah, was orga-
nized in 1947 by W. L.ee Bailey, H. W. McCune, Gayle J. 
Bailey, Grace J. McCune and James P. McCune (Tr. 5). 
A certificate of incorporation was issued by the Secretary 
of State on March 29, 1947, and the corporation thereupon 
commenced business (Exhibit P-4, pages 1-2). 
The first meeting of the corporation's board of direc-
tors was held April 1, 1947. At that meeting an offer was 
presented from Baimac Company, a partnership, offering 
to sell its operating assets, subject to present liabilities, to 
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the corporation in exchange for the corporation's capital 
stock. Baimac Company's assets were shown on an accom-
panying balance sheet at a total value of $127,82H.41, its 
liabilities at $86,278.33, leaving a net value of $41,548.08. 
The offer was accepted and the pre~sident and secretary 
directed to issue all of the ·Corporation's 4,000 shares of 
capital stock in the par value of $40,000.00 to Baimac Com-
pany upon proper transfer of its operating assets.. Stock 
certificate number 1 for 4,000 shares was thereafter issued 
to the partnership pursuant to assignments held by it of 
the original incorporators' stock subscriptions and the terms 
of the offer. Subsequently that ·certificate was surren-
dered and certificate number 2 for 2,000 shares i·ssued to 
W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, and certificate number 
3 for 2,000 shares issued to H. W. M·cCUne and Grace J. 
McCune (Exhibits P-4 ,pages 11-13, and P-5). 
The financial condition of the co~poration after its first 
year of business is reflected in its U. S. Corporation Income 
Tax Return for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1948. 
Sales for the year had totaled $304,143.99 and shown a 
gross profit of $80,840.55. Other i·ncome amounted to $23,-
586.08. Expenses were $79,872.22 leaving a net income 
of $24,554.41 (Exhibit D-18). 
Respondents, W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey, became 
the only owners of capital stock in Baily-McCune ·Company, 
a corporation, on August 31, 1948, when the stock issued 
to H. W. McCune and Grace J. McCUne was purchased and 
retired (Exhibit P-4, Page 22). 
On May 23, 1951, ·almost three years later, appellants, 
E. R. Shaw and Essie 0. Shaw, by- written instrument 
leased certain real property to Baily-McCune Company, a 
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corporation (Exhibit P-6). . The court below found that 
prior to June 1, 1954, the expiration date of the lease, ap-
pellants and the corporation agreed to continue the lease 
in effect from month to month at a reduced rental. (See 
amended finding of fact number 2). The court further 
found that at the time the original lease agreement was 
entered into Bally-McCune Company purchased certain 
items of merchandise from appellants. (See amended find-
ing of fact number 4). Mr. Shaw's own testimony estab-
lished that these transactions were understood and inten-
ded to be with the corporation as shown by the following 
questions and answers: 
"Q. It was your intention and your testimony that 
any lease of these premises after May, 1954, was made 
by the Bailey-McCune Corporation? 
"A. That is right." (Tr. 91). 
"Q. (By Mr. McCune) You didn't have any in-
tention or understanding in any way that Mr. and Mrs. 
Bailey individually were going to buy the merchandise? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You were dealing exclusively with the com-
pany? 
"A. That is right." (Tr. 99) . 
By 1954, Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, was 
experiencing financial difficulties, and during the years 1954 
and 1955 W. Lee Bailey borrowed money on his personal 
holdings and loaned the same to the corporation. Approxi-
mately $9,000.00 of the amounts loaned were not repaid (Tr. 
179-180). Subsequent to the filing of this action, Bailey-
MeCune Company, a corporation, made an assignment for 
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the benefit of its creditors; and the respondent, W. Lee Bai-
ley, contemporaneously therewith, executed a waiver 
subordinating all of his 1claims against the corporation to 
the claims of the other creditors (Exhibit D-19). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In ·connection with this appeal, respondents contend: 
POINT 1 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO STATE ANY 
LEGAL PO,INT OR POINTS UPO,N WHICH THE ·COURT 
CAN PROPERLY REVIEW THE DFJCTSION APPEALED 
FROM. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT PR·OPERLY HELD THAT RE-
SPONDENTS, W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE BAILEY, 
vVERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO APPELLANTS 
IN THE AMO·UNT O·F THE JUDGME.NT AGAINST 
BAILEY-MeOUJ\TE CO~MPANY, A CORPO·RATIO·N. 
A. NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO 
THJE TRIAL CO·URT SHOWING EITHER W. LEE 
BAILEY OR GAYLE BAILEY PERSONALLY TO 
BE PARTIES TO THE LEASE O~R SALE UPON 
WHICH THIS ACTION WAS BASED. 
B. UPON TI-IE LAW AND THE FACTS THE 
TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT BAILEY-McCUNE 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION, WAS NOT THE 
ALTER EGO OF W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE 
BAILEY. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO STATE ANY 
LEGAL POINT OR POINTS UPO·N WHICH THE COURT 
CAN PROPERLY REVIEW THE DECISION APPFALED 
FROM. 
Nowhere have appellants set forth the legal point or 
points upon which they intend to rely for reversal of the 
decision appealed from. Their statement of points reads 
as follows: ''THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THE DE:FENDANTS, W. LEE BAILEY AND 
GAYLE BAILEY, PERSO·NALLY LIABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS IN THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT 
RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT AGAINST BAI-
LEY-McCUNE COMPANY, A CORPORATION." Nothing 
more is stated, and one is left to wonder if appellants con-
tend that it is error for a trial court to find for defendants 
instead of the plaintiffs in an action. In reply to appellants' 
statement of points, respondents ask: Wherein did the trial 
court err? Appellants' brief leaves this question unans-
wered. If there are grounds for the error alleged, appel-
lants are apparently leaving the task of discovering the 
same to someone other than themselves. 
In the case of Anderson v. Wright, 2 Utah 2d 338, 273 
P.2d 418, plaintiffs complained in their brief that they were 
not permitted to introduce evidence of fraud. The court, 
after stating reasons why such eviden·ce was properly ex-
cluded, remarked that plaintiffs' failure to assign such ex-
clusion as error under their statement of points eliminated 
the need for discussing the matter of exclusion. Following 
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such a rule in this case, appellants' failure to assign any 
matters as error under their statement of points eliminates 
the need for discussing this ease. There are no points prop-
erly before the Court for review. 
Respondents respectfully suggest that it is not their 
obligation or that of the Court to search the record in an 
attempt to find possible error which the trial court may 
have committed in order that the same ·can ·be reviewed on 
this appeal. Appellants' failure to designate any such error 
should provide sufficient reason for the Court to affirm 
the decision appealed from. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT PR·OPERLY HELD THAT RE-
SPONDENTS, W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE BAILEY, 
WERE NOT PERSO·NALLY LIABLE TO APPELLANTS 
IN THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT A:GAINST 
BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, A CORPO·RATIO·N. 
A. NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO 
TH!E TRIAL COURT SHO~WING EITHE'R W. LEE 
BAILEY OR GAYLE BAILEY PERSO·NALLY TO 
BE PARTIES TO· THE LEASE O·R SALE UPON 
WHICH THIS ACTION WAS BASED. 
Appellants alleged in their complaint and proved in 
the court below that Bailey-McCune Company, a corpora-
tion, entered into a lease arrangement with them, and also 
that the corporation purchased from them certain items 
of merchandise. When appellants terminated the lease ar-
rangement and served notice to quit it was directed to the 
corporation and not to the individual respondents, W. Lee 
Bailey and Gayle Bailey. (See Exhibit D-11). The appel-
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lant, E. R. Shaw, established by his own testimony that ap-
pellants understood that they were dealing with the corpo-
ration in both transactions and intended to deal with the 
corporation. Mr. Shaw's testimony in this particular is 
found at pages 91 and 99 of the transcript of proceedings 
and is set out in respondents' statement of facts above. 
After having established the fact that Bailey-McCune was a 
valid corporation and ~having obtained a judgment against 
it, appellants now seek on this appeal, as they did in the 
trial court, to ignore the corporation as a mere sham. No-
where in the record will be found evidence showing either 
W. Lee Bailey or Gayle Bailey personally to be parties to 
either the lease or the sale upon whieh this action was 
based. 
B. UPON THE LAW AND THE FACTS THE 
TRIAL COURT F'OUND THAT BAILEY-McCUNE 
CO~MPANY, A CO~RPORATION, WAS NOT THE 
ALTER EGO OIF w. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE 
BAILEY. 
In the court below, appellants vigorously contended that 
corporation in this case was the alter ego of the individual 
defendants W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey. The trial court, 
after hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel 
on this point, permitted written briefs to be submitted with 
.respect thereto. After due consideration of the question, 
the ~court found that Bailey-McCune Company was not the 
alte~r ego of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey. (see trial 
court's ·memorandum decision and amended finding of fact 
number 10). The trial court's finding was proper both as a 
matter of law and a matter .of fact. 
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It is the general rule that a corporation is ordinarily 
regarded as a legal entity separate, distinct and apart from 
the members who com·pose it; and this doctrine applies to 
a corporation whose shares are all owned by one person or 
a few persons. (See 18 C.J.S. Corporations, Sec. 4 pages 
368-369). In Surgical Supply Center, Inc. et al. v. Indus-
trial c·ommission of Utah, 118 Utah 632, 223 P. 5·93, at 
page 636 of the Utah Reports, the Court stated this rule 
as follows: "A corporation is a statutory entity which is 
regarded as having an existence and personality distinct 
from that of its members or stockholders. This is so even 
though the stock is owned by a single individual or differ-
ent corporations." Under the rule that a corporation ordi-
narily is a separate entity, contracts entered into for a cor-
poration by its authorized officers or agents are the con-
tracts of the corporation. Such contracts neither confer 
rights nor impose liabilities or restrictions on the ·members 
or stockholders individually. (See 18 C.J.S. Corporations, 
Sec. 5·c, pages 371-372). 
When, however, the fiction of the corporate entity is 
urged to an intent not ·within its reason and purpose, it 
should he disregarded and the corporation considered as 
an aggregation of persons, both in equity and at law. Fraud 
is a common ground on which the courts will ignore the 
corporate structure. In addition to fraud, the courts will 
often discard the corporate fiction whenever its retention 
would produce injustices and inequitable consequences. 
Nevertheless, a ·corporation ordinarily is to be regarded as 
a separate entity, and such entity will be disregarded only 
\Vhen there are controlling reasons. It must appear not 
only that the corporation is controlled and influenced by 
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one or a few persons, but, in addition, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the corporate cloak is utilized as a sub-
terfuge to defeat public convenience, to justify wrong, or to 
perpetrate fraud. (See C.J.S. Corporations, Sec. 6, pages 
376-379). 
Each case involving disregard of the corporate entity 
must rest upon its special facts, and such determination is 
peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact. As stated 
in the California case of Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 
P.2d 390, at page 394 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"The conditions under Which the corporate entity 
may be disregarded, or the corporation be regarded as 
the alter ego of the stockholders, necessarily vary ac-
cording to the circumstances in each case inasmuch as 
the doctrine is essentially an equitable one and for that 
reason is particularly within the province of the trial 
court.'' 
The trial court in the instant case found no reasons to 
go behind the corporate entity. The court could have 
reached no other conclusion in view of the factual matters 
urged by appellants as a basis for invoking the rule which 
would disregard the corporate entity. Consider briefly the 
following contentions of appellants: 
1. It is obvious from the very beginning of this cor-
poration that it was for sham purposes. Appellants intro-
duced no evidence whatsoever showing the purpose for 
which the corporation was formed other than the recita-
tions in the articles of incorporation. 
2. The corpontion was fomtded for the sole purpose 
of continuing the partnership that previously existed. Re-
spondents are not aware of any rule of law that prevents 
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changing from one form of business organization to another 
in a case such as this. In the case of Surgical Supply Cen-
ter, Inc. et al., cited supra, the Court found nothing unlaw-
ful or sinister in the change from a partnership to a co~ 
ration-and in that case the partnership was continued to 
hold the stock of the corporation formed. 
3. The incorporators never paid in cash for the stock 
which they subscribed. Mr. Bailey testified that his wife 
and he paid for the stock which they subscribed in cash 
(Tr. 13-14). The oath of the incorporators also recites 
that the stock subscribed was paid for (Exhibits P-1 and 
P-4, page 6) . 
4. No stock certificates we,re issued to the original 
incorporators. The corporation's stock book is in evidence 
(Exhibit P-5), and shows the certifieates issued. The orig-
inal incorporators assigned their subscriptions to Baimac 
Company, a partnership, and the 1certificate was issued to 
it (Exhibit P-4, page 11). 
5. There was no affidavit of value of the property 
transferred to the corporation in exchange for stock. The 
transaction with Baimac Company, a partnership, was a 
bona fide sale of stock for the property obtained and took 
place after the corporation com·menced operations. The 
Utah law requires an affidavit of value only when subscrip-
tions consist in whole or in part of property. 
6. The corpo.ration was undercapitalized and over-in-
debted. No evidence was introduced to show what would 
have been an adequate capitalization in a situation such as 
this. The profits reported on the corporation's first income 
tax return show that it began as a successful business ven-
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ture (Exhibit D-18). In connection with the ·matter of in-
adequate capitalization, the Court is referred to the Cali-
fornia case of Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 
197 P.2d 167. In that case the court recognized the rule 
that inadequate financing was a factor in determining 
whether to disregard the corporate entity, but pointed out 
that in such a case it is incwnbent upon the one seeking to 
pierce the corporate veil to show by evidence that the fi-
nancial set up of the corporation is just a sham and accom-
plishes an injustice. The court held that the plaintiff had 
not only failed to show as a fact that the corporation was 
inadequately financed, but had failed to show any causal 
connection between the financing and the injury. It con-
cluded, therefore, that the corporate form of business had 
not been adopted for the purpose of injuring third persons. 
7. The corporation failed to strictly follow certain 
corporate formalities. The matters complained of relate to 
the- government orf the corporation and its internal affairs. 
Where all of the stockholders act in unison, such formali-
ties have little or no :practical purpose. It would seem that 
·a creditor complaining of the lack or neglect of such for-
malities should at least be required to show how the fail-
ure to follow the same resulted in an injury or injustice to 
him. 
8. There was a cO-mingling of corporate and personal 
funds. Appellants attempt to establish this point by the 
testi,mony of the Baileys as to the manner in which they 
drew their salaries. Mr. Bailey's testimony is quite clear 
on this matter.. Salary checks were drawn on a monthly ba-
.sis, although there were times when the same were not 
cashed because of the financial circumstances of the com-
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pany ( Tr. 178) . There was no co-mingling of funds. 
After considering the foregoing matters, it is ques-
tionable, even if they were supported by the evidence, if 
they are of such a nature as to bring this case within the 
rule requiring the Corurt to disregard the corporate entity. 
Can it be said that such matters demonstrate that the cor-
porate cloak was utilized to justify wrong or perpetuate 
fraud? It is further to be observed that the record con-
tains no evidence showing any causal connection between 
the matters complained of and the injury that appellants 
believe they will s~fer. As a matter of fact, appellants 
have not even demonstrated or attempted to show that they 
will suffer any injury or injustice if the Court does not 
pierce the corporate veil. 
In the case of Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 
623, 221 P. 856, an alter ego situation was invoJved. There 
the lower -court had found that the cororation had been or-
ganized by an individual for the transaction of his personal 
business, and that he was the real party in interest in cer-
tain transactions. The ~corporate entity was disregarded. 
On appeal these findings were questioned and the court di~ 
posed of the matter by stating: " ... it is only necessary 
to say that there is ample evidence in the record to sustain 
the court's finding in that regard, and hence this court can-
not interfere." 
In the instant case, the controlling question is one of 
fact: Is Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, the alter 
ego of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey? The lower court 
found that it was not. Even if this is to be considered a 
case in equity and the Court reviews the facts, the finding 
of the trial court should not be overturned and another find-
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ing made rmless the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the trial court's findings. (See Nokes v. Continental Min-
ing & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 9'54, at page 178 
o.f the Utah Reports) . Respondents respectfully submit that 
the finding of the trial court finds ample support in the 
record. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants in this case are contending for a rule that 
would require the Court to disregard the corporate entity 
in every situation where a closely held corporation becomes 
insolvent. To do so would emasculate the closely held cor-
poration as a business organization. 
Respondents respectfully request the Court to affirm 
the decision of the Honorable Joseph E. Nelson holding that 
the respondents. W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey are not 
personally liable to appellants for the reason and on the 
ground that Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, is not 
the alter ego of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle Bailey, and that 
there is no evidence in the record showing the said W. L€e 
Bailey and Gayle Bailey personally to be parties to the 
transactions upon which the corporation's liability was 
based. 
Further, that appellants in this matter have failed to 
state any legal point or points upon which the decision of 
the lower court can be reviewed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT J. SUMSION and 
JAMES P. McCUNE, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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